INTRODUCTION
In the contemporary political climate, for many advocates and critics of liberal democracy, liberalism is the partner of democracy. In their view "democracy" means "liberal democracy" regardless of cultural or national context. (Of course, what is meant by "liberal democracy" ranges hugely!) political institutions of a society such that they make political equality increasingly substantively meaningful.
THE WAY'S WAY TOWARD DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Against the view that democracy is best realized as some form of liberal democracy, I offer an example of a non-liberal democratic theory (or the foundations thereof). For this to be a fruitful engagement we need to start with an idea of democracy without liberal baggage. In my view "democracy" means minimally governance consistent with political equality that is functional, not merely formal. (Formal legal equality is not substantively meaningful if it is undermined by social and economic practices and institutions.) On its own, "democracy" doesn't tell us what institutions best secure that political equality (theoretically, or in a given context). But we do know that a commitment to political equality alone cannot secure political equality. Simple majoritarian, one-person, one-vote democratic decision making can yield political decisions to live by political, economic, and social institutions that support a range of unjust inequalities which undermine the political equality of the numerical minority and which they cannot overturn. Further, any attempt to alter the meaning of political equality from formal political equality cannot be justified on the basis of political equality alone. Any attempt to further define democracy so that it can describe functional political equality needs to turn to other arguments.
A common liberal understanding is that individual rights and freedoms provide a check on the potential for democratically endorsed oppression of simple majoritarian democracy. But many theorists of liberal democracy are not so sure. For example, John Rawls draws our attention to the basic structures of social, economic, and political life as the site ofjustice."1 Robert Dahl describes the contemporary basic structure as undermining democracy because it tends to "produce inequalities in social and economic resources so great as to bring about severe violations of political equality and hence the democratic process.""2 Susan Okin argues that gender hierarchies in social, economic, and political life are mutually reinforcing.13 The obstacles to political equality posed by the institutions of the basic structure are problematic to many liberal democrats, and many are aware of the ways in which the daily practices sustain these institutions.14 However, as illustrated by the tensions between multiculturalism and feminism, liberalism alone does not seem to have the resources to assess the injustices of what we observe: individuals value their social bonds and economic way of life and act in ways that sustain not only those social bonds and that economic way of life but also the hierar-chies that limit their capabilities, including their ability to be equal politically. 15 Not all liberal democrats see the problem. Even those who do are having trouble using the tools of liberal democracy to solve it.'6 Despite this fundamental problem, many treat liberal values as the theoretical bedrock of democratic institutions.'7 In addition, theorists supplement our understandings of the values and institutions of democracy by examining those practices which they argue are constitutive of liberal democracy including deliberation,'8 discourse,"9 participation,20 and representation. 21 Although liberalism's values and institutions are a way of constraining democratically endorsed oppression, liberalism may not be the only value suitable for constraining democratic exclusion or oppression. Further, it may be that from within another political fabric, Confucian institutions and practices may develop a functional democracy that doesn't have the problems of liberal democracy.
Perhaps other values and practices could support democratic institutions-such as elected representative government, competition and cooperation among representatives, a free press, mechanisms for accountability, a rigorous and independent judicial system, and a pluralist civil society.22 Candidates from Confucian thought include respect for the cultivated scholarelite,23 ritual propriety (li),24 accountability,25 mutual aid,26 limitations on central power,27 moral education,28 and intra-community communication. 29 Likewise, Confucian history demonstrates practices which can constrain the abuse of authority30 and institutions that might be redesigned and redeployed to democratic ends in the present. 31 Other comparative approaches to the study of Confucianism and democracy focus on finding commonality within Western and Confucian values. 32 Hall and Ames (1999) and Tan Sor-hoon (2003) focus on the comparison of American pragmatist and Confucian values. Another approach to the study of Confucianism and democracy focuses on the Confucian values that could sustain respect for liberal democratic norms. Most literature of this sort, however, focuses on rights.33 These approaches respectfully illuminate differences and similarities between "Asian" and "Western" values and offer interesting and important discussions of the politics surrounding the characterization of "Asian" and "Western" values.
In each of the works cited above, the authors highlight one or two aspects of Confucian thought that may be complementary to democracy and may be an intellectual resource for a Confucian democracy. I appreciate each of these values, as I think the authors do, as situated in a system of values. Developing Confucian democracy may require developing certain aspects of Confucianism such as those identified by these authors. Further, it may require critically reevaluating other aspects of Confucianism. In order for Confucian democ-racy to be meaningful, it must develop from within the value system, not merely borrow decisive features of it. I am arguing for a Confucian democracy that is very Confucian and democratic.
Although two millennia of dynastic rule and hierarchical bureaucratic structures reified early Confucianists' relationships of hierarchy into exploitable obligations, Confucianism is an intellectual tradition that long predates and post-dates its association with imperial rule.34 My reading of Confucianism is based on appreciating it as a dynamic tradition in which sometimes competing philosophical views were put to political ends through the practice of the cultivated critic. I observe a critical dynamism in a history that others have characterized as uniformly hierarchical. As Li Chenyang notes, much of that characterization itself has more recently benefited those with a particular, sometimes totalitarian agenda, including Western missionaries, the May Fourth New Culture Movement, the Communist Party more generally, and some Western feminist scholarship. 35 The unexamined characterization of Confucianism as hierarchical and static prematurely closes off its consideration as a source of insight for theories about democracy. Moreover, given that in practice democracy is a struggle against anti-democratic politics, a theory of democracy that emerges in an undemocratic context is worthy of further exploration. Through Confucianism's seemingly hierarchical political history, I see an evolving democratic logic. Although there are many aspects of this logic, I treat three as definitive. First, I share the common reading of ren as the core value in early Confucianism which is reasserted as the foundational value of Confucianism by the Neo-Confuciansists in the Song and Ming dynasties and which remains a foundational concept for contemporary Confucianists. Second, I provisionally take one side in the historical debate among Confucianists about human nature. I follow Mengzi in the view that human nature is essentially good. This view requires a lesser degree of deference to hierarchy than the view of Xunzi, whose ethical deference to hierarchy can be used to justify political hierarchy. Moreover, the view of human nature as essentially good treats all institutions as important for their cultivation of individuals and society. Distinctions between social, economic, and political institutions may be descriptive but not theoretically important. Third, I see in the critical practice of Confucian scholar-activists-from Kongzi through the present-an obligation to criticize political authority in a way that contemporary democratic theorists treat as foundational to democracy.36 Confucian critics carry out two critical projects. They criticize political practice for not following the way (dao)-the cosmic order which requires among other things treating the people humanely-and they reinterpret their own critical practice in response to external criticism and criticism from the margins.37
While historically, the institutional space for such criticism and political contest has been limited, Confucian political thought suggests that such space is essential for Confucianism and thus institutions of democratic contestation are the realization of Confucian thought.38
Taken together these three values-humanity, good human nature, and political criticism-are constitutive practices of cultivation. We need to assess critically social, economic, and political practices so that they are most conducive to developing each person such that a Confucian democracy is a society where ren is lived. The framework itself is ready to deal with the functioning of the institutions of the basic structure-with how people actually act within them. Although there are ways in which anti-democratic tendencies may develop through these practices of cultivation, the Confucian practice of reflection on institutions and practices suggests that the theory itself has a method for reflecting on potentially anti-democratic practices. Using these three as a foundation, we can then further the Confucian democratic project by thinking about the Confucian democratic way to understand and foster ritual propriety (li), righteousness (yi), wisdom (zhi), right action (xin), reverence (jing), benevolence (hui), dutifulness (zhong), thinking (si), and virtue (de). But first, let's see how these ideas emerge in the history of Confucian political thought.
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF CONFUCIANISM
Confucianism is an intellectual tradition of political and social thought that predates Kongzi (Confucius, 551-479 B.C.), the scholar for whom it is named, and continues today as a vibrant field in ethical, theological, social, legal, and political thought. Although Confucian ethical thought entails notions of hierarchy and has been appealed to to justify abusive authoritarianism during parts of its history, the abuse of political authority is not supported by the ethical tradition. Throughout its long history, key elements of Confucianism have been subjects of debate and interpretation. The three steps which I argue are part of a Confucian path to democracy are present in early Confucian thought, reemerge throughout its history, and are recurring subjects of debate within the tradition. Thus, this Confucian path to democracy is as dynamic as the tradition itself.
Kongzi was born into the low aristocracy and briefly held an administrative government post. As a public administrator and throughout his life as a teacher of future political advisors, Kongzi was a political and social critic. He taught that the "way" meant living according to traditional virtues: humaneness (ren), ritual propriety (1i), righteousness (yi), and wisdom (zhi). As ren is asserted as the foundational virtue, the debate about human nature recurs. The brothers Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi (1033-1107) rekindle the debate between Mengzi and Xunzi. Neo-Confucianism splits into two schools of thought-the school of mind/heart and the school of principle. The former emphasizes Mengzi's interpretation of human nature. The latter emphasizes Xunzi's concern about human nature. I will argue shortly that Xunzi's view promotes deference to a moral authority that defines right and wrong and administrates public life accordingly, but that Mengzi's view does not require such deference to hierarchy. The later allows and encourages a critical deference to moral authority as part of moral education, enabling the developing person to carry out moral action because he understands their propriety, not just because he was told they were right.
During the Song and Ming dynasties, Confucianism was again the state philosophy. However, over time in the civil service exams, certain interpretations were required to pass the exam. State Confucianism became the practice of deference to authority by bureaucrats rather than the practice of advising authority by ministers. In this sense Confucianism was institutionalized in authoritarian rule.
From this specific political history, Confucianism earned its reputation as the handmaiden of authoritarianism. During this rule, texts were abridged to delete references critical of absolute monarchy,50 works were banned, and critics were imprisoned. Yet, importantly for a Confucian path to democracy, despite repression, there continued internal debates about the appropriate political policies and practices for following the way. And, as de Bary argues with in-depth discussion of Lii and Fang, Neo-Confucianists were critical of abuses of political authority when they were out of political favor too (1991).51 With the collapse of the Chinese empire, due to its political association with failed empire, Confucianism was somewhat discredited. Yet, because it knits together strands of thought that have been part of Chinese intellectual and common thought for thousands of years, it maintains its appeal and is used by democratic reformers. 52 Contemporary Confucianists discuss the meaning of ren, human nature, and the possibilities for rearticulating Confucianism without undermining its core. One key question for the rearticulation of Confucianism for democracy is the importance and role of hierarchy.
According to some contemporary Confucianists, Confucianism requires ritual propriety, which in the historical cultural context of the primary texts meant filial piety and fraternal duty, but which need not take so hierarchical a character.53 For others, the essential insights of Confucianism can be formulated without hierarchy and gender roles.54 In my view, exploitable hierarchy, not hierarchy per se, is an important practical obstacle to democracy."55 The challenge for contemporary scholars of Confucianism is to reveal Confucianism's dynamism and not to reinvent or reify its associations with authoritarian and exploitable hierarchies. Among contemporary Confucianists there is some disagreement as to the appropriate relative emphasis of ren (humaneness) and li (ritual propriety),64 but both schools understand ren as requiring moral behavior toward humanity. Running throughout is the understanding that ren requires acting humanely, benevolently, and sympathetically toward others. Rulers fail when they do not; individuals cannot realize their internal principle or follow the way if they do not; society will not function well if leaders and the people do not behave humanely toward one another. Moral behavior can be expected of rulers, ministers, and scholars who cultivate their individual virtues, but it can also be recognized and practiced by those less cultivated (Mencius IIIB9; The Great Learning VI).
While not uncontroversial, my view of ren as a system of obligation based on respect for close relationships and requiring the extension of humane behavior toward those beyond one's immediate relationships is supported by the historical texts themselves and affirmed by some Neo-Confucianists and contemporary Confucianists. Note: I am not arguing that alone ren is a tool for democracy.65 Rather, with human nature (understood as I describe in the next section), ren can guide social criticism (as understood in the following section) toward Confucian democracy. Ren without confidence in human nature and social criticism can be conducive to a wide range of political theory, not all of which would be considered democratic.
Human Nature
A second piece of a Confucian democratic theory is to view human nature as essentially good, taking one side in a historical debate within Confucianism. Confucianists debate whether the purpose of cultivation in the way is to develop humans' essentially good character or to counter their essentially bad character. Both conceptions of human nature require attention to the educational role of institutions; however, the latter view may be a tool for justifying more rigid adherence to rites as a hierarchical practice of cultivation.66 At stake is our ability to integrate our knowledge with our moral intuitions and experiences.
Both intuition and inquiry require cultivation. According to Mengzi and Lu Xiang-shan we know right and wrong through intuition; whereas according to Xunzi we know right and wrong through inquiry and study. Following Xunzi, Neville argues that because humans fall short in humaneness, ritual propriety-and its associated practices of hierarchy, structured education, and cultivation of lay people by scholar-officials-fosters healthy community life and thus human development.67 Neville does not argue that contemporary hierarchies should mimic historically Confucian hierarchies, but rather he sees a significant role for ritual propriety in guiding Confucian life. Tu Weiming and Berthrong place greater relative importance on ren, which for them means emphasizing human potential and human creativity.68 In this they display a greater confidence in the lay person's cultivation and ability to weigh Confucian values and thus to criticize misguided authority for failing to follow the way. Though different in emphasis, both perspectives yield a criticism of abuse of political authority which I argue next is important for Confucian democratic theory.
To the extent that the negative view of human nature provides an ethical justification for political oppression, Mengzi's interpretation is more democratic: human nature needs to be cultivated in order to follow the way and the process is one of developing good human potential, not of suppressing an innately bad human nature. A Confucian democracy must foster a Confucian life understood as being cultivated through the rites and practices of social, economic, and political institutions. The democratic implication of this understanding is that while all institutions play a role in cultivating "the overarching virtue of being a perfected human being" (ren), they also play a role in fostering the functional political equality of citizens. A Confucian democracy requires practices of cultivation that do not create exploitable hierarchies and thus threaten political equality. Confucian democratic theory can be further developed through reflection on the ways in which social, economic, and political duties can cultivate ren in people and political equality among citizens. Politics for all people (tiam xia weigong) is theoretically open to a range of social, economic, and political institutional designs for cultivating ren.
Criticism, Cultivation, and Modeling
The third piece of a Confucian democratic theory is not based on interpretation of texts in the same way that the first is. Nor is it based on a historical debate as the second is. Rather, through the texts and practices, I read into the history of Confucianism a practice of social and political criticism that, when guided by ren and the cultivation of human nature, is democratic. Although there is no reason that viewing political life as always changing or opposites as complementary need be the basis of democratic norms, when combined with a basic respect for humanity and human relations, they can be. Combined, these norms require the institutional space for maintaining the contestability of political decisions. They require an ethical fabric to political life, but not the use of political authority to impose ethical life. Within this interpretation of the tradition, Confucian ethical and political life are always in process, always changing, and always the legitimate subject of criticism such that the role of the Confucian scholar-critic is to try to change political practice so that it realizes respect for ren.
Just as the meaning of ren is not static, Confucian philosophy, as Ouyang Xiu (1007-1072) argued more generally, does not defend a static or constant view of political life or authority.69 Although in the dynastic history of China, the authority of the state has been labeled "Confucian," as a political philosophy, Confucianism does not endorse the abuse of authority or the use of rites to maintain political authority, but rather fosters a system of social order in which both political authorities and the people live according to rites, which teach them "all the great principles of morality."70 As suggested by the passages from the Mencius above, morality-the way of heaven, an allencompassing humaneness-is realized through ethical and political practice: through the modeling of the sages, the critical attention of scholars, and the cultivation of the character of all people under proper leadership and institutions. From its earliest available accounts, Confucian political thought has had both philosophical and practical dimensions. Although there is disagreement among them on administrative issues, Confucianists and NeoConfucianists envision political reform as incremental and subject to administrative stability. 71 Scholar-officials, Kongzi and Mengzi were social and political reformers. They sought to advise emperors on political reform but they did not offer authoritarian dictates. Instead they encouraged self-cultivation in line with morality.
Ji Kangzi asked, "How can I cause the common people to be respectful, dutiful, and industrious?"
The Master said, "Oversee them with dignity, and the people will be respectful; oversee them with filiality and kindness, and the people will be dutiful; oversee them by raising up the accomplished and instructing those who are unable, and the people will be industrious." (Analects 2.20)
This form of authority certainly respects hierarchy and may often end in the exploitation of hierarchy. But such exploitation is a failure of duty. In the exploitative exercise of authority, humaneness is sacrificed and authority (whether parental or public) cannot be understood as following the way. However, as in the above passage from the Analects, social change is encouraged by good modeling, not by dictate. 72 Because in practice people, especially rulers, fall short of realizing ren, ren is a basis of, or guide for, criticism. Appreciating other humans as essential for one's moral life, the Confucianists use ren to encourage both the treatment that one may be due and the treatment that one may owe others individually and collectively. The scholar's moral education of rulers requires political criticism of those rulers who do not act benevolently toward their people. Scholars sometimes refuse to advise those who seek to exploit and who do not govern well (Mencius IIA2, VB 1).
While upholding ren, Confucianism is a basis for contextually relevant social criticism. While his following of the way must be unchanging, the Confucian scholar who advises authority recognizes that circumstances pre- Confucianists have an explicit responsibility to guide social change with social criticism that is appropriate to the times and yet consistent with ren and the way.
In the second millennium of Confucianism, the Neo-Confucianists' predecessors looked to immediate history to address practical problems. For example, Liu Zongyuan (773-818), Du You (735-812), and Sima Guang (1019-1086) reason by analogy, drawing on the classics for moral cultivation and on history for "more detailed data for evaluating policy and responding to continuous and diverse changes. Recent history was most useful and relevant" (Tillman 1982, 34) . The predecessors of the Neo-Confucianists were more conservative than the Confucianists or Neo-Confucianists in that they raised the role of tradition and historical experience in guiding critical thought. Yet, they did not abandon the critical project.
Due to the philosophical threats they considered from Buddhism and Taoism, and to the political threats from foreigners, the Neo-Confucianists were likewise reformers. Among themselves, the Neo-Confucianists differ in their cosmological ideas and likewise differ on practical, political, and administrative questions. Generally, however, following and developing the intellectual work of their teachers and guided by ren, the Neo-Confucianists fostered social change through changes in custom and education in order to bring practice in line with humaneness, and turned to social and political criticism when either through intuition or experience they found government action falling short. 76 The Neo-Confucianists were critical of corruption and also of specific practices. In his capacity as a government administrator, Zhu Xi was a reformer of social customs including marriage and education. According to Zhu Xi, morality ought to follow the past but not be a slave to it; rather one should be reflective with a critical mind. Though he disagreed with Zhu Xi about functions of knowledge and action, Lu Xiang-shan's views lead us to the same conclusion about the necessity of social change.77 Following Mengzi, he argued that knowledge is useless unless carried out. The three elements of Confucian democracy I have been describing-ren, good human nature, and political criticism-are contested concepts. Who can practice ren, and toward whom? What is human nature? What political criticism should be made? Each of these questions could be answered in a decisively undemocratic way. In a Confucian democratic theory, while respecting the alternative view, the democrat answers that ren is a practice by all toward all but the practice takes place in the context of relationship. While appreciating that hierarchy can be an important tool in self-cultivation, the democrat does not rely on it to determine the will of the people. Conse-quently, while political criticism could be directed elsewhere as well, it should at least generate scrutiny of potentially exploitable hierarchies.
A Confucian Democratic Foundation
While I have not argued that Confucianists or Neo-Confucianists took these three ideas in a democratic direction, it would be Confucian to do so. Moreover, it is democratic to take these Confucian ideas seriously.
First, the notion that ren-"the overarching virtue of being a perfected human being"-is potentially realizable by all of humanity has institutional implications that are democratic. Even if one expects that few but the scholarelite would actually be able to achieve ren, the possibility means that social, economic, and political institutions should not function so as to constrain anyone's potential. Further, institutions should not prejudge the potential contributions of all.
Moreover, ren is a social concept. As Ames and Rosemont describe it, ren is a fairly simple graph, and according to the Shuowen lexicon, is made up of the elements ren "person", and er, the number "two." This etymological analysis underscores the Confucian assumption that one cannot become a person by oneself-we are, from our inchoate beginnings, irreducibly social.... Certainly the human being as a focus of constitutive relationships has an initial disposition (Analects 17.2). But ren is foremost the process of "growing (sheng)" these relationships into vital, robust, and healthy participation in the human community.85
The implication of ren's social dimension when all of humanity is understood as having the potential to cultivate ren is that it cannot be realized without institutional conditions that enable its development for all. Focusing on the Neo-Confucian reworking of the Buddhist concept of yin and yang, Chan Sin Yee argues that it is Confucian to criticize social and political barriers to women's political participation and workplace opportunities and barriers to men's active role in nurturing and developing children.86 Again, the interpretive implication of this reading of ren is that it is more Confucian to have institutions that are conducive to the development of all.
The second element draws our attention more closely to the integrated role that all institutions play in developing human potential. Both sides of the human nature debate value moral cultivation, but the interpretation of human nature as good invites us to be more critical of potentially exploitable hierarchies. Further, Confucian thought gives us lots of reasons to appreciate the impact of social and economic institutions and practices on political life. Consequently, the institutional implication of this second element of Confucian democratic theory is that institutions of the family, work life, social life, and political life should function so as not to create hierarchies that would limit the potential of anyone to develop. Like the first, this view treats all of these institutions as resources for developing our understandings of our obligations and duties toward one another. A Western liberal interpretation of this might be to argue that there should be institutional mechanisms for restraining discrimination. The Confucian interpretation is that we should design institutions such that they do not discriminate because discriminatory practices restrain the cultivation of human potential.87 However, because it is Confucian to build on political tradition, Confucian democratization does not mean designing institutions from scratch. Therefore, we may need to make existing institutions more Confucian by removing barriers to developing all humans' potential.
Consequently, the third practice of criticism is essential and cannot be meaningfully directed at political institutions only. In social, economic, and political institutions, critical practices need to be cultivated. Moreover, the possibility of critical analysis of social and economic practices to influence political discussions should be cultivated through institutional channels as well. Again, a Western liberal interpretation of the institutional implications of this practice might be institutional protections for critics as captured in a free press or freedom to associate. However, the institutional implications are not merely protective. Confucian democracy would have institutions that cultivate critical practices, not merely allow them, not merely prevent their oppression.
These three form a foundation for a Confucian democratic theory, but they are not sufficient. Such a theory has additional issues and institutional implications to consider. Three problems related to this foundation itself bear considering. First, how good are Confucian theoretical resources for evaluating whether a hierarchy is exploitable? Second, what are the Confucian theoretical resources for assuring that duties are practiced in a way that supports Confucian democracy? Is political criticism an adequate tool for perpetually submitting to evaluation social, political, and economic practices for their potential to exploit hierarchies? Third, how important to Confucianism is it that the concept of Heavenly Principle be understood transcendentally? If Confucianism relies on a transcendent concept, is Confucian democracy appropriate only in contexts where this worldview is universally shared? A Confucian democratic theory needs to engage with these questions. The foundation of Confucian democratic theory proposed in this article has the resources to engage with these questions, but I don't offer it as the Confucian democratic theory, but more modestly as a historical and theoretical way to think about the foundations of a Confucian democracy.
CONCLUSION: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO GLOBAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY
The ongoing dialogue among critics (lay, scholar-official, activist, and theorist) maintains democratization as a vibrant way of life and not merely as a prescribed set of values or institutions criticized from the margins and hypocritically defended from the center. Western liberal thought provides only one set of traditional contexts for those lives, values, and institutions. Confucian political thought offers another. If we think of democratization as critical practice, clarified and deepened by its engagement with complementary and contaminating traditions, then we may fruitfully learn from these engagements in the further development of democratic theory.
The Confucianism I learn from in this article is not wed to a particular political program or form of government. Further, its relation to political power has changed over time. Because of these two ways in which it is dynamic, Confucianism offers the same depth to the study of political philosophy that it has offered philosophers, theologians, and scholars of religion.88
With its experiences of dissent and change, each cultural and political tradition offers valuable information for developing a theory of democracy through criticism. Critical and deliberative democratic theorists have begun to develop this vein of thinking about democratic theory within the Western tradition. Comparative political thought is essential to this project. 89 The goal is not to add "foreign" insights to an existing Western model, but to develop a theory of democracy through interpretation cross-culturally, drawing on the strengths of various traditions, learning from dissenting voices within and across them, and transforming their respective notions of democratization into a collectively recognizable practice. If our philosophies and cultural tropes are constrained by our cultural, intellectual, and practical experiences, then cross-cultural dialogue offers real promise for expanding human imaginations such that we may be able to bring about democratic life where it is overtly valued and constructively support its development where it is valued by people at the margins of their polities. NOTES minzhu ("rule by the people") and its contemporary Confucian support, see Thomas Metzger,
